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Abstract
We nd that di¤erences in the ability to devote cognitive resources to a strategic
interaction imply di¤erences in strategic behavior. In our experiment, we manipulate the
availability of cognitive resources by applying a di¤erential cognitive load. In cognitive load
experiments, subjects are directed to perform a task which occupies cognitive resources,
in addition to making a choice in another domain. The greater the cognitive resources
required for the task implies that fewer such resources will be available for deliberation
on the choice. Although much is known about how subjects make decisions under a
cognitive load, little is known about how this a¤ects behavior in strategic games. We run
an experiment in which subjects play a repeated multi-player prisoners dilemma game
under two cognitive load treatments. In one treatment, subjects are placed under a high
cognitive load (given a 7 digit number to recall) and subjects in the other are placed under
a low cognitive load (given a 2 digit number). According to two di¤erent measures, we
nd evidence that the low load subjects behave more strategically. First, the behavior of
the low load subjects converged to the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium prediction at
a faster rate than the high load subjects. Second, we nd evidence that low load subjects
were better able to condition their behavior on the outcomes of previous periods.
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1 Introduction
There have been advancements in the understanding of play in games based on the con-
ceptualization that players devote heterogenous levels of cognition to deliberation on their
strategy (Stahl and Wilson, 1994, 1995; Nagel, 1995; Costa-Gomes et al., 2001; Camerer et
al., 2004). These advancements specify that the players exhibit heterogenous levels of strate-
gic sophistication. This conceptualization is often supported by observing play in a game
and determining whether these models improve the t with the observations. In addition
to comparing the predictions with the observations, these models are also supported by the
measurement of data related to the level of cognition. For instance studies measuring the
decision to lookup relevant and available information,1 eyetracking studies which measure the
location of the attention of the subjects,2 measures of the intelligence of the subjects,3 and
even neurological data4 have been seen as providing evidence in support of these models which
posit heterogenous strategic sophistication.
In a rough sense, these experimental papers ask whether one can observe the e¤ects of
cognition on strategic behavior. In these studies, researchers perform a measure of cognition
or a measure related to the level of cognition and compare this with the observed behavior in
games. In this paper we take a complementary approach. Rather than measure the level of
cognition or perform a measure related to the level of cognition, we manipulate the level of
cognition. This procedure has the advantage that, since we can randomly assign subjects to
a level of cognition, our results are not possibly driven by an unobserved characteristic which
is only related to cognition. Although we do not study behavior which would provide direct
evidence on hierarchical models, similar to these papers, we are interested in examining the
role of cognition in strategic outcomes. In this sense, the present paper is complimentary way
of asking, "Are there brains in games?"
In the experiment described below, we nd a relationship between the heterogenous ability
1See Camerer et al. (1993), Johnson et al. (2002), Crawford (2008), Costa-Gomes et al. (2001) and
Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006).
2For instance, see Wang et al. (2010) and Chen et al. (2010).
3For instance, see Bayer and Renou (2011), Brañas-Garza et al. (2011), Devetag and Warglien (2003), and
Gill and Prowse (2012).
4For instance, see Coricelli and Nagel (2009).
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to devote cognitive resources to a strategic interaction and behavior in the interaction. This
heterogeneity arises because we apply a di¤erential cognitive load on subjects who are playing
the game. In cognitive load experiments, subjects are directed to perform a memorization
task in parallel to making a choice in another domain. This additional memorization task
occupies cognitive resources which cannot be devoted to deliberation on the choice. In this
sense, the condition of subjects under a larger cognitive load could be thought of as similar to
the condition of subjects with a diminished ability to reason.
Much is known about the behavior of subjects under a cognitive load. For instance, the
literature nds that subjects under a larger cognitive load tend to be more impulsive and less
analytical. However, little is known about how cognitive load a¤ects play in strategic games.5
This experiment seeks to clarify the relationship between cognitive load and behavior in
games. Further, due to the similarity between the condition of being under a cognitive load
and the condition of having a diminished ability to reason, our experiment attempts to shed
light on the relationship between intelligence and behavior in games. One might be tempted to
conclude that the diminished ability to reason would generate obvious predictions; for instance
that subjects under a smaller cognitive load would behave in a manner which is closer to the
equilibrium behavior. However, the predictions on this front are far from obvious due to the
observation of positive relationship between a measure of intelligence and cooperation in the
repeated prisoners dilemma game.6
In our experiment, we impose a cognitive load on subjects who are playing a repeated multi-
player prisoners dilemma game. In each period, subjects are told to memorize a number. In
the low load treatment, this is a small number and therefore relatively easy to remember. In
the high load treatment, this is a large number and therefore relatively di¢ cult to remember.
The subjects then play a four-player prisoners dilemma game. After the subjects make their
choice in the game, they are asked to recall the number. As suggested above, subjects in
the low load condition are better able to commit cognitive resources to deliberation on their
5Researchers have also studied the e¤ects of the contraints on the complexity of strategies on outcomes in
the nitely repeated prisoners dilemma game. For instance, see Neyman (1985, 1998). Also see Béal (2010)
for a more recent reference. Our study can be thought to perform a similar exercise in the laborary.
6For instance, see Jones (2008).
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action in the game.
Of course, the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) of the nitely repeated multi-
player prisoners dilemma game is for each player to select the uncooperative action in every
period. As with most experimental investigations of the prisoners dilemma game, we do not
observe this. We do nd that the behavior of the subjects in the low load condition converges
to the SPNE prediction at a faster rate than those in the high load treatment. We also
nd that low load subjects are better able to condition their strategy on previous outcomes.
These ndings suggest that our manipulation of the availability of cognitive resources a¤ects
strategic behavior in our setting.
1.1 Related Literature
The cognitive load literature nds that subjects under a larger cognitive load tend to be more
impulsive and less analytical. These di¤erences in behavior stem from the fact that those
under a larger cognitive load are less able to devote cognitive resources to reect on their
decision. For instance, Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999) describe an experiment in which subjects
were given an option of eating an unhealthy cake or a healthy serving of fruit. The authors
found that the subjects were more likely to select the cake when they were under a high
cognitive load.
Much is known about how the cognitive load a¤ects subjects in nonstrategic settings. In
addition to being more impulsive and less analytical (Hinson et al., 2003) it has been found that
subjects under a cognitive load tend to be more risk averse and exhibit a higher degree of time
impatience (Benjamin et al., 2012), make more mistakes (Rydval, 2011), have less self control
(Shiv and Fedorikhin, 1999; Ward and Mann, 2000), fail to process available information
(Gilbert et al., 1988; Swann et al., 1990), perform worse on gambling tasks (Hinson et al.
2002), are more susceptible to a social label (Cornelissen et al., 2007), and have di¤erent
evaluations of the fairness of outcomes (Cornelissen et al., 2011; van den Bos et al., 2006;
Hauge et al., 2009).
However, to our knowledge, there are only two papers which investigate the relationship
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between the manipulation of cognitive load and behavior in games, Roch et al. (2000) and
Cappelletti et al. (2011). Roch et al. (2000) found that subjects under the low cognitive load
condition requested more resources in a common resource game. However, in Roch et al. the
subjects were not told the penalty if the sum of the groups requests exceeded the amount
to be divided. As a result, one cannot determine whether the cognitive load manipulation
implied di¤erences in strategic behavior or di¤erences in the regard for instructions which are
not incentivized.
Cappelletti et al. (2011) studied behavior in the ultimatum game and varied the ability of
subjects to deliberate by manipulating both time pressure and cognitive load. The authors
found that time pressure a¤ects the behavior of both proposer and responder. However, the
authors found that cognitive load does not a¤ect behavior as either a proposer or responder.
In contrast, we nd that cognitive load does a¤ect strategic behavior in our setting. The
di¤erence in the e¢ cacy of the cognitive load manipulation is likely due to the di¤erences in
its incentivization. We further discuss this issue below.
There is a recent interest in the relationship between intelligence and preferences.7 This
literature nds a negative relationship between intelligence and both risk aversion and time
impatience. We note the similarities between the ndings in the intelligence literature and
those in the cognitive load literature. Therefore, to the extent that manipulating cognitive
load is analogous to manipulating the intelligence of the subject, we now discuss the literature
on the relationship between measures of intelligence and behavior in games.8 For instance,
Burnham et al. (2009) found a relationship between a measure of intelligence and strategic
behavior in a beauty contest game. Jones (2008) found a relationship between cooperation
in the repeated prisoners dilemma and the average SAT scores at the university where the
experiment was conducted.9 Devetag and Warglien (2003) found a relationship between the
7See Benjamin et al. (2012), Brañas-Garza et al. (2008), Burks et al. (2008), Dohmen et al. (2010),
Frederick (2005) and Oechssler et al. (2009). See Ben-Ner et al. (2004), Branstätter and Güth (2002), Chen et
al. (2011a) and Millet and Dewitte (2007) for more on the relationship between social preferences and measures
of intelligence.
8Also see Bajo et al. (2011), Ballinger et al. (2011), Bayer and Renou (2011), Brañas-Garza et al. (2012),
Brañas-Garza et al. (2011), Chen et al. (2009), Chen et al. (2011b), Gill and Prowse (2012), Jones (2011),
Palacios-Huerta (2003), Putterman et al. (2011) and Rydval (2011).
9See Rydval and Ortmann (2004) for a similar result.
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working memory capacity of a subject and the congruence of play to equilibrium behavior.
We contribute to this literature, rather than measuring cognition, by manipulating cognition
and examining the implications in a strategic setting.10
Finally note that our paper relates to the rational inattention literature.11 These models
assume that decision makers are unable to process all of the available information, however
they optimally allocate their attention in order to make decisions. Central to these models,
it is assumed that agents have constraints on their ability to process information. In our
experiment, we provide evidence of these constraints in that subjects under a smaller cognitive
load are better able to condition their play on the outcomes of previous periods.
2 Method
A total of 60 subjects participated in the experiment. The subjects were graduate and
undergraduate students at Rutgers University-Camden. The experiment was conducted in
two sessions of 16, one session of 12, and two sessions of 8. The experiment was programmed
and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
Subjects were matched with three other subjects in which they were to play a repeated
prisoners dilemma game. The subjects were told that the group would remain xed through-
out the experiment.12 The subjects were given no additional information about the group
members.
The individual decision was to select X (the cooperative action) or Y (the uncooperative
action). Of the four subjects in the group, if x play X then selecting X yields a payo¤ of
20x points whereas selecting Y yields 20x + 40. The exchange rate was $1 for every 150
points. Additionally, the subjects were paid a $5 show-up fee. While making a decision in
the game, the subjects were provided with the payo¤s in two formats. The subjects were told
10Somewhat related to our approach, Bednar et al. (2012) describe an experiment in which subjects simul-
taneously played two distinct games with di¤erent opponents. The authors found that behavior in a particular
game was a¤ected by the corresponding paired game. Also see Savikhina and Sheremeta (2012).
11See Sims (2003) for an early reference. See Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009) and Reis (2006) for
subsequent e¤orts. Also see Wiederholt (2010) for an overview of the eld.
12The instructions were given via power point slides. The slides, along with any experimental material, are
available from the corresponding author upon request.
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that both formats presented identical information. See the appendix for the screen shown to
the subjects during their decision in the game.
Before play in each period, the subjects were given 15 seconds in which to commit a number
to memory. The subjects were aware that they would be asked to recall the number after
their choice was made in the game. There were two cognitive load treatments: in the low
load treatment, subjects were directed to memorize a 2 digit number, and in the high load
treatment, subjects were directed to memorize a 7 digit number. There were 26 subjects
in the low load treatment and 34 in the high load treatment. The subjects were told that
they would only receive payment in the periods in which they correctly recalled the number.
In other words, the subjects would receive nothing for the periods in which they incorrectly
recalled the number.
After each period, subjects were given feedback regarding play in the game, however they
were not given feedback about their performance on the memorization task. Across all
treatments, the composition of 12 of the 15 groups was homogenous, in that they contained
only a single load treatment. However, there were 3 groups which were mixed in the sense
that that 2 subjects were in the low load treatment and 2 were in the high load treatment.
We refer to this group as mixed. We did not provide any information about the possibility of
di¤erent treatments or mixed groups.
To summarize the timing in each period, subjects were given the number (7 digits or 2
digits), they made their choice in the game, they were asked to recall the number, and they
were given feedback on the game outcome but not on the memorization task outcome. Each
of these stages were designed so that the subject would not proceed to the next stage until
each subject completed the prior stage. This procedure was repeated for 30 periods, with a
new number in each period. The average amount earned was $14:76.
At the conclusion of period 30, the subjects answered the following manipulation check
questions on a scale of 1 to 7: Which featured into your decisions between X and Y , your
prudent side or your impulsive side (1 prudent, 7 impulsive)? How di¢ cult was it for you to
recall your numbers (1 very di¢ cult, 7 not very di¢ cult)? How di¢ cult was it for you to decide
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between X and Y (1 very di¢ cult, 7 not very di¢ cult)? How distracting was the memorization
task (1 very distracting, 7 not very distracting)? and How many of the memorization tasks
do you expect that you correctly answered (1 none correct, 7 all correct)?
The z-Tree output specied the time remaining when the Click to Proceed button was
pressed. However, there were instances where the output suggested that the decision was
made with 99999 seconds remaining. This output seems to have occurred if the "Click to
Proceed" button was pressed before the clock could begin. In the stage in which the number
was given to the subjects, we recorded the 56 instances of the 99999 output as 16, because 15
seconds were allotted. In the stage in which the number was to be recalled, we recorded the
5 instances of the 99999 output as 16, because 15 seconds were allotted.
2.1 Discussion of the Experimental Design
Before we describe the results, we discuss the design of the experiment. Although the cognitive
load manipulation is common, to our knowledge, we are the only example of a paper in which
the manipulation is repeated. As a result, it was not obvious to us whether we should balance
the experiment so that each subject would undergo the high and low loads an equal number
of times. However, we decided to keep the subjects in a single treatment throughout the
experiment. In part, this decision was due to the results in Dewitte et al. (2005) which
reports that the e¤ects of the cognitive load manipulation can be lasting. Also note that we
decided to use a 7 digit number as the high load manipulation because it is standard in the
literature and because Miller (1956) found that this tends to be near the limit of the memory
of subjects.13
The bulk of the cognitive load literature does not incentivise the memorization task.14 To
our knowledge, Benjamin et al. (2012) and Cappelletti et al. (2011) are the only examples
of experiments with such material incentives. Cappelletti et al. (2011) paid the subjects per
correct digit. On the other hand, we pay the full amount earned in the game for correct
recall and we pay nothing for incorrect recall. However, like Cappelletti et al. (2011), we do
13Also, see Cowan (2001) for more recent view on the memory capacity literature.
14Although there is evidence that subjects perform better on tasks which require attention when the tasks
are incentivized. See Camerer and Hogarth (1999).
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not provide feedback regarding the accuracy of the memorization task. We make these two
design decisions in order to reduce the ability of the subjects to strategically allocate cognitive
resources. In particular, we want to avoid providing an incentive for the subjects to seek
an interior solution to the trade-o¤ between devoting cognitive resources to the memorization
task and deliberation on the game. In other words, we designed the experiment in such a way
that the subjects had an incentive to guarantee that su¢ cient cognitive resources were devoted
to the successful recall the number, then devote any remaining resources to deliberation on
their behavior in the game.
Another means of incentivising the cognitive load, without inducing possible di¤erences in
payment, is to pay the subjects based on the rank of correct answers within their treatment.
While this procedure has the advantage that payments across treatments would be equal, in
our view this is less satisfactory than our design. First, in order to make these instructions
comprehensible, we would have to explain to the subjects that there are di¤erent cognitive
load treatments. We had a preference to avoid informing the subjects that there would be
di¤erent treatments because we were concerned that the subjects in the high load treatment
might resent their di¢ cult task, and this resentment might a¤ect their behavior. Second, the
rank payment scheme would possibly encourage the subjects to seek an interior solution to
the trade-o¤ between devoting cognitive resources to the memorization task and deliberation
on the game. Again, if subjects can reduce their memory load, without signicant nancial
penalty, then it is likely that we would not observe the e¤ects of the treatment. When
considering the relative advantages of the rank payment scheme and our design, it would seem
that the latter is preferable.
Also note that we designed the experiment so that the subject would only enter the fol-
lowing stage when all other players completed the preceding stage. This was done in order
to mitigate the ability of the subjects to strategically decide the timing of their decisions.
In other words, due to our design, there was little incentive for the subjects in the low load
condition to quickly leave the stage where they were given the number. Additionally, the
subjects in the high load condition could not quickly make their decision in the prisoners
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dilemma game, in order to spill their number in the memorization task. We suspect that our
results would be stronger if we allowed subjects to immediately proceed to the subsequent
stage.
Finally, we study the four-player prisoners dilemma15 because it has a few attractive
features for the purpose of examining the role of cognitive load in strategic games. The game
is relatively simple because the decision is binary and the game is linear. In order to keep the
game from being too complicated, we did not elect to use a more general public goods game.
On the other hand, the four-player version requires more thought than the two-player version
because outcomes depend on the actions of three opponents, rather than just one opponent.
Further, we were concerned that the subjects could be familiar with the two-player version
and would possibly import this prior experience into the experiment. For this reason, we
employed the four-player version.
3 Results
3.1 Manipulation checks and overview of the data
All ve of the manipulation check questions demonstrated di¤erences between the high and low
load treatments. Specically, those in the high load treatment reported being more impulsive
(Z(58) = 1:77, p = 0:076),16 having more di¢ culty in recalling the number (Z(58) = 4:19,
p < 0:001), having more di¢ culty in deciding on an action in the game (Z(58) = 1:39,
p = 0:16), found the memorization task to be more distracting (Z(58) = 4:10; p < 0:001), and
expected to correctly recall the number with lower precision (Z(58) = 2:56, p = 0:011) than
those in the low load treatment. Further, the subjects in the high load treatment spent a
signicantly longer time committing the number to memory (M = 9:15, SD = 4:93) than did
the subjects in the low load treatment (M = 1:19, SD = 2:20), Z(1798) = 32:62, p < 0:001.
Despite its di¢ culty, we were surprised by the success of the high load subjects on the
memorization task. In the high load treatment, 820 of the 1020 (80:4%) of the memorization
15See Komorita et al. (1980).
16These are the results of two-sided Mann-Whitney tests between the high and low load subjects.
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tasks were preformed correctly. By comparison, 766 of 780 (98:2%) of the memorization tasks
in the low load were preformed correctly.
Finally, we provide an overview of the rates of cooperation in the experiment. In Table
1, we list the rates of cooperation by treatment and the period in which it occurred.
Table 1. Cooperation rates by treatment and period
Periods 1  5 6  10 11  15 16  20 21  25 26  30 Total
High Load 0:494 0:406 0:365 0:341 0:318 0:365 0:381
Low Load 0:515 0:400 0:438 0:408 0:315 0:192 0:378
Z-statistic 0:363  0:102 1:291 1:180  0:041  3:254  0:137
p-value 0:716 0:919 0:197 0:238 0:967 0:0011 0:891
We report the results of Mann-Whitney tests for the di¤erence between
the cooperation rates for the high and low load treatments. We perform
these tests on blocks of 5 periods and also on the aggregate data. The
former tests have 298 degrees of freedom and the latter test has 1798
degrees of freedom.
Table 1 suggests that there does not exist a large di¤erence between the overall rates of
cooperation of the high and low load subjects. When considering the periods in blocks of 5 or
the aggregate data, we only nd a signicant di¤erence between the treatments in the nal 5
periods. This suggests that, as the end of the game approached, the low load subjects played
more strategically than the high load subjects. We also note that considering the periods in
blocks of 10 can also be helpful. While there is no di¤erence in cooperation in the rst 10
periods (Z(598) = 0:187, p = 0:852), the low load subjects cooperate more that the high load
subjects in the middle 10 periods (Z(598) = 1:75, p = 0:080), and the low subjects cooperate
less in the nal 10 periods (Z(598) =  2:30, p = 0:021). A glance at Table 1 also suggests
that subjects across both treatments converged to the SPNE behavior. We now conduct a
more detailed analysis of the behavior of the subjects.
3.2 Di¤erences in behavior
We begin the analysis with cooperation in the game. Here, our dependent variable obtains a
value of 1 if the cooperative action (X) was selected and 0 otherwise. We use a dummy variable
where 1 indicates that the subject was in the low load treatment and 0 otherwise. We also
use a dummy variable indicating whether the period was within the nal 5 periods. We use
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a dummy variable indicating whether the group was mixed and therefore contained subjects
from both the high and low load treatments. Note that the xed-e¤ects regressions below, and
throughout the paper, are specic to the subject rather than the group. While the groups are
xed throughout the experiment, there also exists subject-specic unobserved heterogeneity
which remained constant throughout the experiment. As a result, we conduct subject-specic,
not group-specic, xed-e¤ects. See Table 2 for the results of these regressions.
Table 2. Logistic regressions of cooperation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Period  0:0336  0:0399  0:0248  0:0282  0:0418
(0:00572) (0:00627) (0:00891) (0:00956) (0:00813)
Low Load     0:333    
(0:199)
Last 5     0:0432 0:0547 0:483
(0:179) (0:194) (0:235)
Last 5-Low Load      0:0233  0:0335  1:294
Interaction (0:0116) (0:0130) (0:326)
Last 5-Mixed         0:292
Interaction (0:387)
Fixed-e¤ects? No Yes No Yes Yes
 2 Log L 2355:44 2049:69 2351:29 2042:82 2032:31
LR 2 35:19 340:94 39:34 347:81 358:32
We provide the coe¢ cient estimates with standard errors in parentheses, where
* indicates signicance at 0.1, ** indicates signicance at 0.05, and *** indicates
signicance at 0.01. Each regression has 1800 observations.
The analysis summarized in Table 2 conrms our intuition from Table 1. First, note
that there is strong evidence of convergence to the SPNE prediction. In every specication
involving the period, our results indicate that subjects played less cooperatively across time.
We also nd weak evidence that subjects in the low load treatment were more cooperative
than the subjects in the high load treatment. Additionally, we nd that the actions of the
subjects in the low load treatment converged to the SPNE behavior at faster rate than those
in the high low load treatment. Further, this relationship continues to hold when we account
for the mixed nature of the groups. We summarize this analysis with the following result.
Result 1 Across both treatments, behavior converged to the SPNE behavior, however the
convergence was faster for the low load subjects.
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We note that our result is not sensitive to the specication of the convergence. A model
with an interaction between the period and the low load dummy, rather than the interaction
between the Last 5 dummy and the low load dummy, produces very similar results. However,
in a model in which both interaction terms are included, the interaction involving Last 5 is
signicant and that involving the period is not signicant.17
3.3 Di¤erences in cognitive resources or di¤erences in expected payments?
One potential explanation for the di¤erence in the behavior of the subjects in the high and low
load treatments relates to a possible di¤erence in the expected payments across treatments.
It is possible that the high load subjects expected to earn less than the low load subjects, and
the di¤erence in expectations, rather than the di¤erence in the cognitive load, implied the
di¤erence in behavior. Although it would seem di¢ cult to argue that Result 1 was driven
by a di¤erence in payment expectations, it remains a possibility. While it is not possible to
determine the precise di¤erence in the payment expectations, it is possible to look for evidence
that the di¤erence in behavior was motivated by the income e¤ect rather than the cognitive
load.
One possibility is that the subjects in the high load treatment completely forgot the num-
ber, and therefore selected the action in the game with the knowledge that they would not
receive payment in that period. If this was the case then we would expect to see subjects
quickly entering an incorrect number so that they could use this additional time to rest and
therefore perform better in the subsequent period. In other words, we will look for evidence
that high load subjects quickly entered incorrect responses to the memorization task. In Ta-
ble 3 we demonstrate the relationship between the memorization task and the time remaining
when the stage was exited. In particular, we provide the number of correct responses, the
number of total responses, and the percent correct by the time remaining when the stage was
exited. Recall that subjects were given 15 seconds in which to provide the number.
17These results are available from the corresponding author upon request.
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Table 3. The number of correct memorization task responses, total responses, and
percent correct by time remaining and treatment
Time Remaining 14 or more 13 or 12 11 or 10 9 or 8 7 or 6 5 or less
Correct 21 365 281 91 41 21
High Load Total 22 400 347 130 60 61
Percent 96% 91% 81% 70% 69% 34%
Correct 414 287 46 16 1 2
Low Load Total 421 287 48 17 1 6
Percent 98% 100% 96% 94% 100% 33%
In Table 3 we observe that relatively few incorrect responses to the memorization task
occur early in the stage. This suggests that it was not common for the subject to leave the
game stage having forgotten the number because there is evidence that the subjects exerted
e¤ort to correctly perform the memorization task. The data summarized in Table 3 seems to
be consistent with the hypothesis that the subjects in both treatments attempted to correctly
perform the memorization task, albeit the high load subjects took longer and did so with less
success.
While the results of Table 3 suggest that the subjects attempted to correctly respond to
the memorization task, it is possible that response times would not capture the perceived
likelihood of payment. To account for this possibility, we employ a di¤erent measure of the
subjects expectation of payment in that period: whether the subject correctly responded to
the memorization task in that period. Here we preform an analysis, similar to that summarized
in Table 2, with the exception that we include a variable Correct, which assumes a value of 1
if the memorization task in that period was performed correctly, and 0 otherwise. We present
a summary of this analysis in Table 4.
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Table 4. Logistic regressions of cooperation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Period  0:0336  0:0399  0:0348  0:0417  0:0417
(0:00572) (0:00627) (0:00740) (0:00813) (0:00813)
Low Load     0:168    
(0:111)
Last 5     0:441 0:536 0:482
(0:209) (0:224) (0:235)
Last 5-Low Load      1:005  1:294  1:293
Interaction (0:294) (0:326) (0:326)
Last 5-Mixed         0:288
Interaction (0:387)
Correct  0:211  0:0637  0:214  0:0510  0:0469
(0:149) (0:186) (0:155) (0:185) (0:185)
Correct p-value 0:16 0:73 0:17 0:78 0:80
Fixed-e¤ects? No Yes No Yes Yes
 2 Log L 2353:45 2049:58 2341:07 2032:79 2032:24
LR 2 37:18 341:05 49:56 357:84 358:39
We provide the coe¢ cient estimates with standard errors in parentheses, where
* indicates signicance at 0.1, ** indicates signicance at 0.05, and *** indicates
signicance at 0.01. We also provide the p-value for the Correct variable. Each
regression has 1800 observations.
First, we note that Result 1 is not a¤ected by the presence of the Correct variable. In
other words, given our measure of the condence that the subject would correctly perform
the memorization task in that period, we still observe convergence to the SPNE behavior and
that this convergence is faster for the low load subjects. Second, we note that the Correct
variable is not signicant in any of the regressions. Hence, there does not appear to be a
relationship between cooperation and successfully performing the memorization task in that
period.
Alternatively, we could account for the possibility of di¤erences in the expectations of pay-
ment by excluding observations in which the subject incorrectly performed the memorization
task. Consider an analysis similar to that summarized in Table 2, with the exception that we
only include the 1586 observations in which the memorization task was performed correctly
in that period. These results are qualitatively similar to that summarized in Table 4.18 In
light of the analysis discussed above, we o¤er the following result.
18These results are available from the corresponding author upon request.
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Result 2 We do not nd evidence that the subjects were motivated by a di¤erence in
payment rather than by a di¤erence in cognitive load.
3.4 Di¤erences in game outcomes
Despite these di¤erences in behavior, it is unclear whether there are corresponding di¤erences
in game outcomes. We perform an analysis, similar to that summarized in Table 2, except that
the dependent variable is the outcome of the game and we perform the analysis with ordered
multinomial logistic regressions. For the purposes of the analysis below, we do not account for
the accuracy in the memorization task. In other words, in the regressions below, we use the
payo¤s which would have been earned had the memorization task been performed correctly.
We describe this variable as provisional payo¤s. Here we consider provisional payo¤s because
we want to avoid introducing unwarranted di¤erences between the treatments. Note that up
to this point, we what now describe as provisional payo¤s, we referred to as game outcomes.
We will henceforth use the term provisional payo¤s. These regressions are summarized in
Table 5.
Table 5. Ordered multinomial logistic regressions of provisional payo¤s
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Period  0:0311  0:0337  0:0325  0:0350  0:0350
(0:0050) (0:00508) (0:00654) (0:00663) (0:00663)
Low Load     0:214    
(0:095)
Last 5     0:219 0:249 0:189
(0:182) (0:184) (0:191)
Last 5-Low Load      0:387  0:468  0:480
Interaction (0:233) (0:236) (0:237)
Last 5-Mixed         0:328
Interaction (0:293)
Fixed-e¤ects? No Yes No Yes Yes
 2 Log L 4921:75 4615:37 4915:91 4611:31 4610:04
LR 2 38:60 344:99 44:44 349:04 350:32
Ordered multinomial logistic regressions with a dependent variable of provisional
payo¤s earned in the stage game. We provide the coe¢ cient estimates with
standard errors in parentheses, where * indicates signicance at 0.1,** indicates
signicance at 0.05, and *** indicates signicance at 0.01. Each regression has
1800 observations.
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We nd evidence that the provisional payo¤s were decreasing across periods. This result
is not surprising because, as we found earlier, the behavior of the subjects converged to the
SPNE behavior. We also nd that the low load dummy variable is signicant, although in
this analysis signicant at 0.05. Again, this is not surprising because we found a similar
relationship between the low load dummy and cooperation. Also not surprisingly, we nd
that the low load subjects obtained signicantly lower payo¤s in the last 5 periods than did
the high load subjects.
Although we do not present this analysis in Table 5, we note that these results are not
a¤ected by a variable indicating whether the memorization task was correctly performed in
that period. Further, we note that our results continue to hold when the analysis is conducted
as a linear regression rather than as ordered multinomial logistic regressions. We summarize
this analysis with the following result.
Result 3 The provisional payo¤s of the subjects in both treatments converged to the
provisional payo¤s predicted by the SPNE outcome. Also the provisional payo¤s of the low
load subjects converged to that predicted by SPNE faster than did that of the high load
subjects.
3.5 Di¤erences in ability to condition on previous outcomes
To this point, we have found that the low load subjects were more strategic in that their
behavior converged to the SPNE prediction at a faster rate than did the behavior of the high
load subjects. Now we explore another measure of strategic behavior: whether the low load
subjects were better able to condition their play on past outcomes. In order to investigate this
possibility, we o¤er a model of cooperation which is possibly dependent on previous outcomes.
In the analysis described below, we assume that the subject considers features of these previous
outcomes to be state variables upon which play can be conditioned. In other words, we do
not intend to provide a model of learning.
We now describe two such variables upon which the subject could condition. One possi-
bility is that the subjects would condition play on the number of other players in the group
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who played cooperatively in the previous period. In other words, we compare the action
selected in period t with the number of other group members who played cooperatively in
period t  1. In the description below, we refer to this variable as Lagged Number of Others
Playing X. Note that this variable can range from 0 to 3. Another possibility is that subjects
would condition play on the change in cooperation between the previous period and the period
preceding that. In other words, we compare the action selected in period t with the di¤erence
between the number of other group members who played cooperatively in period t 1 and the
number who played cooperatively in period t  2. We refer to this variable as Lagged Change
in Others Playing X. Note that this variable can range from  3 to 3. Finally, we include the
three relevant interaction terms. The results of this analysis are summarized in Table 6.
Table 6. Fixed-e¤ects logistic regressions of cooperation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged Number of Others Playing X 0:0523    0:0733  0:196
(0:0849) (0:125) (0:128)
Interaction with Low Load 0:0677   0:431 0:397
(0:133) (0:197) (0:199)
Lagged Change in Others Playing X   0:0753  0:0142 0:0786
(0:0621) (0:110) (0:112)
Interaction with Low Load    0:112  0:317  0:312
(0:097) (0:137) (0:138)
Lagged Number of Others Playing X     0:0947 0:0825
-Lagged Change Interaction (0:0517) (0:0521)
Period        0:0340
(0:00736)
 2 Log L 1987:63 1894:62 1885:26 1863:54
LR 2 302:54 313:43 322:79 344:52
We provide the coe¢ cient estimates with standard errors in parentheses, where *
indicates signicance at 0.1, ** indicates signicance at 0.05, and *** indicates
signicance at 0.01. Due to the nature of the lagged variables, regression (1) has
1740 observations and regressions (2)   (4) have 1680 observations.
In regression (1) we do not observe a signicant relationship. In particular, we do not
observe a relationship between cooperation and the number of others playing cooperatively
in the previous period. Further there is not a signicant di¤erence between the treatments
regarding the sensitivity to the number of others playing cooperatively in the previous period.
In regression (2), we observe a similar lack of signicance as in regression (1). There we do not
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nd evidence of a relationship between cooperation and the lagged change in others playing
cooperatively. Finally, we do not observe a signicant di¤erence between the treatments
regarding the sensitivity to the changes in cooperation.
However, in regression (3) signicant relationships emerge. Although again neither mea-
sure of previous cooperation is signicant, we do observe a di¤erential sensitivity to both
measures of previous cooperation. We nd that the low load subjects were more sensitive to
the number of others playing cooperatively in the previous period than the high load subjects.
Additionally, the low load subjects were more sensitive to the change cooperation than the
high load subjects. In regression (4) we also account for the period in which the decision was
made. Here we still observe signicance of the di¤erential sensitivity for both measures.
Consider the signs of the signicant variables in regressions (3) and (4). We note that the
interaction between the treatment and Number of Others Playing X is positive. This suggests
that low load subjects were more likely than high load subjects to cooperate in response to a
high level of cooperation in the previous period. We also note that the interaction between
the treatment and the Change in Others Playing X is negative. This suggests that low load
subjects were more likely than high load subjects to play uncooperatively in response to an
increase in cooperation between the previous period and the period preceding the previous
period.
Although the lack of signicance in regressions (1) and (2) above, seems dissonant to the
signicance in regressions (3) and (4), intuition on the matter is relatively straightforward.
Behavior is not exclusively a function of the level of cooperation in the previous period or
exclusively a function of the change in the cooperation, but it is a function of both variables.
Consider a subject making a decision regarding cooperation, where 2 of the 3 other subjects
played cooperatively in the previous period. By itself, the number of cooperators in the
previous period has no context, and is therefore not a su¢ cient basis on which to make the
choice. If the number of cooperators rose from 1 to 2, the subject could regard that as
di¤erent from the situation in which the number of cooperators fell from 3 to 2. Therefore,
it is not surprising that signicant relationships only emerge when we consider both the level
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of cooperation and the change in cooperation.
To further analyze the relationship between cognitive load and the sensitivity of coopera-
tion to previous outcomes, we run the following xed-e¤ects logistic regressions. In the rst
regression, we restrict attention to high load subjects. In the second regression, we restrict
attention to low load subjects. The results are summarized in Table 7.
Table 7. Restricted xed-e¤ects logistic regressions of cooperation
High Load Low Load
Lagged Number of Others Playing X  0:0706 0:354
(0:125) (0:154)
Lagged Change in Others Playing X 0:0252  0:385
(0:123) (0:145)
Lagged Number of Others Playing X 0:0639 0:138
-Lagged Change Interaction (0:0677) (0:0802)
 2 Log L 1128:28 756:487
LR 2 126:12 197:078
Observations 952 728
We provide the coe¢ cient estimates with standard errors in
parentheses, where * indicates signicance at 0.1, ** indicates
signicance at 0.05, and *** indicates signicance at 0.01.
The High Load regression provides no evidence of a relationship between cooperation
and the variables. By contrast, the Low Load regression indicates that each of the variables
attains a level of signicance. In particular, the number of others playing cooperatively is
signicantly related to the cooperation of the low load subjects at 0:05. Further, the lagged
change in others playing cooperatively is related to cooperation for the low load subjects at
0:01. Together the results in Tables 6 and 7 suggest that the low load subjects were more
sensitive to previous outcomes than were the high load subjects. We summarize this analysis
with the following result.
Result 4: There is evidence that the low load subjects were better able to condition their
behavior on previous outcomes than the high load subjects.
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4 Conclusion
So are there brains in games? Our results suggest a qualied "yes." Given our manipulation
of the availability of cognitive resources in our particular strategic environment, we found that
di¤erences in cognitive resources imply di¤erences in strategic behavior. While we found that
behavior of both high and low load subjects in the multi-player prisoners dilemma converged
to the SPNE behavior, we also found that the behavior of the low load subjects converged
to the SPNE prediction at a faster rate than that of the high load subjects. Additionally,
we found evidence that the low load subjects could, better than high load subjects, condition
their behavior on previous outcomes.
The relationship between cognitive resources and play in games is also of interest to re-
searchers who study nonequilibrium models. In response to the mounting evidence that
subjects rarely play according to the equilibrium predictions, researchers have been turning
their attention to nonequilibrium models which can account for hierarchical levels of thinking
(Camerer et al., 2004; Costa-Gomes, et al. 2001). It would seem natural to expect that the
intelligence of the subject would be related the level of strategic sophistication of the subject.
However, Georganas et al. (2010) found that the mapping of measures of intelligence to the es-
timated hierarchical level of thinking varies across games. While there could be other reasons
for this negative result,19 evidence of this kind is crucial in supporting existing nonequilibrium
models or in suggesting modications to existing models. While the repeated nature of our
experiment does not provide direct evidence related to the cognitive hierarchy literature, our
paper suggests that it could be fruitful to investigate the relationship between the nonequilib-
rium models and the intelligence of subjects, through the application of a di¤erential cognitive
load.
We also note that the predictions of rational inattention have been studied in the lab-
oratory.20 The results of our experiment suggest that manipulating the ability to process
information via cognitive load could be a productive supplement to e¤orts to observe behavior
consistent with rational inattention.
19See Crawford et al. (2012).
20See Cheremukhin et al. (2012).
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There remain several interesting and unanswered questions. For instance, it is unclear
how the results would be a¤ected by a game other than the multi-player prisoners dilemma.
In other words, it is unclear how our results would be a¤ected by an increase (i.e., a public
goods game or auction) or a decrease (i.e., a two-player prisoners dilemma) in the complexity
of the game. We hope that future work will examine the relationship between cognitive load
e¤ects and the complexity of games.
Another unanswered question relates to the signicance of the incentives regarding the
memorization task. While our cognitive load manipulation was successful, and we did not
nd evidence of an income e¤ect, it is possible that the subjects were motivated by di¤erences
in payments across treatments. In other words, since payment was only made when the
memorization task was correct, and the memorization task for the high load subjects was
more di¢ cult, it is possible that the subjects acted di¤erently as a result of the nancial
incentives rather than as the result of the cognitive load. We hope that future work can
address this issue.
Finally, note that we only applied a cognitive load during the stage in which the subjects
selected an action in the game. We conjecture that our results would be strengthened if the
load was applied during both the game decision stage and the feedback stage. However, we
leave it to future work to test this conjecture.
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Appendix
The screen during the game decision:
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